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Abstract Human thinking is heterogeneous, and among its different forms, thinking 
in dyadic oppositions is associated with the concept of themata. Gerald Holton cha-
racterises themata as elements that lie beneath the structure and development of 
physical theories as well as of non-scientific thinking. Themata have different uses, 
such as a thematic concept, or a thematic component of the concept; a methodologi-
cal (or epistemological) thema; and a propositional thema. Serge Moscovici has pla-
ced the concept of themata in the heart of his theory of social representations which 
is based on ‘natural thinking’ and on forms of daily knowing, including common 
sense. In this article I shall explore some features of thematic concepts and of me-
thodological themata in scientific theories and in common sense. More specifically, 
I shall refer to the significance of the methodological (or epistemological) thema the 
Self and Other(s) in common-sense thinking and in social practices.
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1. Introduction
Since the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies, the relations between science and common sense have been the 
subject matter of numerous explorations by scholars ranging from phi-
losophers to social and human scientists (Marková, 2016). These explo-
rations take diverse perspectives. Some of them treat common sense 
and science as continuous or discontinuous forms of knowledge; others 
emphasise the ‘superiority’ of science over ‘inferiority’ of common sense; 
still others are preoccupied with the public understanding of science; 
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and with attempts to ‘scientify’ common sense. Among these diverse 
perspectives, the suggestion that science and common sense are con-
nected through themata brings new arguments into these debates. With 
this in mind, in this article I shall explore the nature of the relations 
between Holton’s concept of themata in scientific explanations, and 
common-sense assumptions of themata in Moscovici’s theory of social 
representations. 
2. Holton’s Dangerous Direction 
Human thought is heterogeneous and it takes different forms. These 
may involve problem-solving, the formation of concepts, the search for 
similarities and differences between events, objects and people, the cre-
ation of images, thinking in dyadic oppositions, and many others. Among 
these different forms, thinking in dyadic oppositions is associated with 
the concept of themata, which was introduced into the domain of scien-
tific explanation in 1973 by Gerald Holton. Holton characterised themata 
as basic elements that underlie the structure of physical theories and 
their development. These elements often appear in antithetical modes 
like ‘evolution and devolution, constancy and change, complexity and 
simplicity, reductionism and holism, hierarchy and unity, the efficacy 
of mathematics (for example, geometry) versus the efficacy of mecha-
nistic models as explanatory tools’ (Holton, 1975, p. 330). These basic 
constituents motivate as well as constrain the creation of ideas and the 
development of concepts. 
Antithetical modes of thinking to which Holton refers are widespread 
and one can hardly refute their existence. An enormous amount of schol-
arly literature has discussed thinking in oppositions throughout the his-
tory of humankind. It has referred to thinking in antinomies in all cultures 
of the world, comparing and contrasting their diverse forms in ancient 
Greece and China, as well as in modern philosophy and in human and 
social sciences (Lloyd, 1966; Marková, 2003). The broadly based anthro-
pological, historical and sociological evidence of thinking in polarities 
and antinomies shows that some dyadic antinomies have been conceived 
as strictly separated from one another while others as mutually intercon-
nected. With respect to the former, Aristotle’s law of non-contradiction 
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prohibits the co-existence of oppositions in thinking, one excluding the 
other. Concerning the latter, the Chinese opposites Yin and Yang are 
conceived as interdependent and mutually transforming one another. 
Thinking in antinomies was also pervasive in European mediaeval mysti-
cism, as well as in the Renaissance; it pre-occupied philosophers such as 
Jacob Böhm, Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, to mention 
but a few (for a review of diverse conceptions based on oppositions in 
thinking see Marková, 2003).
And yet, when Gerald Holton came up with the idea of dyadic oppo-
sitions in scientific thinking that he called themata, he noted that he 
undertook ‘an undeniably dangerous direction’ (Holton, 1973, p. 215). 
The dangerous direction to which he referred concerned his defiance of 
the established rules of explanation in science, and specifically in phys-
ics. These rules were based on the manipulation of forces in Euclidean 
space, and expressed in the xy plane. Such well-established conventions 
assumed that physical explanations were founded purely on measure-
ments, empiricism and formal analytic procedures. In referring to these 
reputed guidelines, Holton (1973, p. 186) recalls the famous quote of 
the nineteenth century British scientist Lord Kelvin who stated that if 
you cannot measure and express in numbers what you talk about, ‘your 
knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind’. Such knowledge, Lord 
Kelvin continued, can scarcely advance towards the stage of Science with 
the capital S. In contrast, Holton thought that such a narrow perspective 
was totally incapable of accounting for discoveries, inventions and the 
growth of scientific knowledge.
But how can one capture the human capacity to invent, imagine and 
create new knowledge? In his search for an answer, Holton postulated 
themata. Since these elements usually appear in antithetical modes, they 
may explain the diversities of scientific thinking. Holton was well aware 
that a hardnosed scientist could scarcely accept such a concept: the-
mata are not objectively observable; they are implicitly assumed rather 
than being in the explicit awareness of the researcher; and they can-
not be measured. But Holton committed even more significant offences 
against Science. He broke down the traditional division between sci-
ences and non-sciences by emphasizing that themata belong not only to 
the world of science, but that they underlie human thinking in general: 
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they arise from humans’ ‘general imaginative capacity’ (Holton, 1973, 
p. 214). Moreover, he argued that themata are shared by members of a 
community, although they are uniquely developed and transformed by 
individuals. 
While thinking in oppositions has been widely discussed in historical 
and cultural treatises all over the world, Holton’s idea of themata takes a 
new direction in scientific explanation. He argues against the oversimpli-
fied assumptions of science and non-science. Such assumptions conceive 
science as being concerned with empirical and analytic (analytic in the 
sense of formal rules) components, while non-science, such as literature, 
arts and other fields involve decisions that are predominantly aesthetic, 
qualitative or mythical. Totally rejecting this perspective, Holton claims 
that in a deep sense, science is a cultural and historical product: ‘Sci-
ence is in a dynamic interaction with the total intellectual activity of an 
age ... it may underlie the work of the artist, just as it penetrates into 
the explanation a mother gives to her child to help him understand the 
way things move’ (Holton, 1973, p. 202). This is why science cannot be 
reduced to purely empirical and formal analytic claims. Instead, it is the 
thematic thinking, that is, the thinking in oppositions that enables human 
creativity and leads to discoveries. True, there are areas in physics in 
which, Holton (1975, p. 332) notes, thematic thinking does not seem 
to be of much help. This, however, does not belittle the argument con-
cerning the prominent role of themata in many physical theories. Since 
human thought is diverse and heterogeneous, the researcher must be 
open to different kinds of explanation.
3. Themata in Social Representations
Serge Moscovici (1961) formulated the theory of social representations 
in his classic book on La psychanalyse: son image et son public. Social 
representing is rooted in ‘natural thinking’, that is, in daily thinking. It 
orientates modes of knowing, acting, and communicating about specific 
phenomena in social realities with which humans are engaged. 
These pluralities of ‘natural thinking’ all coexist together. They may 
include contradictory forms, discontent, conflicts, desires, hopes, fears 
and otherwise. This means that in and through representing humans 
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make sense, create and imagine meanings of phenomena in their every-
day realities, and transform them into new realities. Examples of these 
could be democracy, injustice, health, illness, and any other phenomena 
that create tension among individuals, groups and institutions, are pub-
licly discussed, circulate and are transformed through communication. 
Moscovici (1984) was particularly interested in the transformation of 
scientific knowledge into common-sense knowledge. He used the term 
‘common sense’ in a very broad sense and it originally included forms 
of practical, imaginative and symbolic knowing and reasoning that were 
part of ‘natural thinking’ (Moscovici, 1961). Later on, he distinguished 
two forms of common-sense knowledge (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983). 
One form, which he called ‘first-hand knowledge’, is naïve and sponta-
neous knowledge based on tradition and consensus, which gives rise to 
the development of science. The second form of common sense arises 
from the public understanding of science: it is the science transformed 
into daily knowledge through communication, the diffusion of science 
by instruction and through the media. 
Influenced by Holton’s ideas, Serge Moscovici brought the notion of 
themata into the theory of social representations (Moscovici, 1993; Mos-
covici and Vignaux, 1994/2000). However, Jesuino (2008) notes that 
as early as in the first edition of Psychoanalysis (Moscovici, 1961), one 
finds forerunners to dyadic themata. Moscovici was well familiar with 
Marxist dialectics and it was this philosophical tradition that was already 
apparent in his first publications. For example, when he articulated social 
psychology as a discipline in movement, Moscovici conceived it as dou-
bly orientated with respect to several kinds of dyadic micro-social versus 
macro-social oppositions in tension (Faucheux and Moscovici, 1962). 
These included oppositions like individuals versus groups, personal-
ity versus culture, psychology versus sociology, and so on. Moscovici 
thought that as a hybrid discipline in continuous movement, social psy-
chology should focus its interest on different ways of coping with ten-
sions produced by these dyadic relations. Later on, still other dyadic 
oppositions in tension dominated Moscovici’s thought, such as majority 
versus minority, common sense versus science, and knowledge versus 
belief. He considered that the study of tensions between such dyadic 
oppositions constituted the challenge to, and specificity of, social psy-
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chology. Holton’s concept of themata as dyadic oppositions inspired 
Moscovici to develop this concept in his theory of social representations. 
He not only adopted the concept of themata, but and he placed them 
‘at the heart of social representations’; he likened themata to ‘concept 
images’, ‘primary conceptions’ or ‘primitive notions’ (Moscovici and Vig-
naux, 1994/2000, pp. 176–177).
We can conclude that while Holton focuses on the role of themata in 
scientific explanations, Moscovici emphasised the role of themata in 
daily understanding, knowing and believing, and therefore, in the the-
ory of social representations. By placing themata ‘at the heart of social 
representations’ Moscovici linked together scientific and common-sense 
forms of thought. In the context of this article, I shall consider it suffi-
cient to use the term ‘common sense’ in Moscovici’s broadly based sense 
as implicitly and explicitly socially shared forms of knowing, acting and 
communicating. Yet we need to ask what exactly is it that makes themata 
such a significant feature of scientific and common-sense thought? Let 
us reflect on some of their characteristics.
4. From Dyadic Oppositions to Themata 
4.1 Which Dyadic Oppositions become Themata?
Although all dyadic oppositions have the potential of becoming the-
mata, it does not mean that all of them become so transformed. More-
over, sciences and non-sciences provide different responses to the ques-
tion as to which dyadic oppositions turn the potentiality of becoming 
themata into actuality. 
In scientific explanations, Holton notes that he could find no more than 
fifty themata in physical sciences, and he believes that it would not be 
possible to identify more than a hundred. They represent the basic ele-
ments of thinking in physics in terms of dialectic oppositions (although 
occasionally they appear as single elements or as triplets) such as sta-
bility and change, complexity and simplicity, analysis and synthesis, or 
symmetry and asymmetry. For example, complexity and simplicity was 
one of the two main themata (the other thema was necessity) in cosmol-
ogy of Mikulas Copernicus (Holton, 1978). Analysis and synthesis were 
the dominant themata of Isaac Newton (Holton, 1978). Einstein’s pref-
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erence for symmetry over asymmetry is well documented (see below). 
Holton claims that in the history of science it is very rare to notice the 
appearance of a new thema. One example to which he refers is Niels 
Bohr’s complementarity (see below) (Holton, 1974, pp. 115–161). How-
ever, when a new thema appears, it is long-lived and endures through 
the revolutionary changes of Kuhnian (Kuhn, 1962) scientific paradigms 
(Holton, 1975, p. 333). 
Although Holton (1978) devotes the whole section in his book on The 
Scientific Imagination to the public understanding of science and to 
public education, he does not discuss themata in this context. Thus it 
appears that while scientific themata permeate discourses in scientific 
communities, they have no place in the public understanding of science. 
Instead, we could suggest that discourses which are concerned with the 
public understanding of science, are generated from themata that arise 
from common-sense thinking. 
In contrast to physical sciences, the number of themata in com-
mon-sense thinking is potentially without limits. In human societies, 
dyadic oppositions may refer to regularities in life which could have phys-
ical, biological or social character and which, due to their uniform and 
repetitive natures, have become established in history and culture (e.g. 
Vico, 1744/1948; Husserl, 1913/1962; Lindenberg, 1987). Examples of 
physical dyadic oppositions could be warmth and coldness, hardness and 
softness, or heaviness and lightness. Biological dyadic oppositions could 
refer to birth and death, hunger and fullness, wellness and sickness. 
Social dyadic oppositions could refer to friends and enemies, to ‘we’ 
and ‘they’, to trust and distrust. Such physical, biological and dialogical 
uniformities and regularities are sensed as repetitions and relative con-
stancies in daily life and in communication; they are passed on from par-
ents to children over generations. Although they may change over time, 
they provide substantial resources of common-sense knowledge. They 
usually operate at a non-conscious level and they are implicitly shared 
by communities. In this sense they are potentialities that may enter into 
speech and communication whenever suitable circumstances arise. Any 
dyadic oppositions can become themata if they are sources of dispute, 
interest, negotiation, tension or conflict among individuals, groups and 
societies. When such situations occur, the relevant oppositions rise to 
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awareness; they start generating concrete contents, raise questions and 
produce disputes. Depending on the circumstances, they topicalise con-
tents and arguments in different directions: they become thematised in 
speech and communication. In thematising opposing positions in public 
disputes humans respond to current problems. In this process themata 
transform and innovate themselves in social, political, cultural and his-
torical contexts. 
4.2 Commitment to Themata
Holton (1974) places emphasis on commitment, weight and the role 
that researchers attribute to particular themata which then become the 
guiding forces of their work. Let us think about the famous example of 
the power of commitment with reference to one of the most fundamental 
themata in physics, that of continuity versus discontinuity. At the begin-
ning of the twentieth century physicists struggled with the problem how 
to explain the duality of light which presents itself sometimes as having 
a ‘corpuscular’ and sometimes as having a ‘wave’ nature. On the one 
hand, there was the perspective of physicists such as Schrödiger and 
de Broglie, who tried to explain the nature of light in terms of ‘waves’ 
as a continuous process. On the other hand, Heisenberg viewed light 
in terms of a discontinuous ‘corpuscular’ approach. What is so curious, 
Holton (1974, p. 133–134) emphasises, is that the involved physicists 
made their diverse interpretations of the nature of light on the basis of 
observations of ‘the same’ data. He comments that rarely ever has there 
been a more striking battle in the history of science between different 
themata. Correspondence from Schrödiger and Heisenberg, using very 
strong language on both sides, shows the mutual disgust of these two 
physicists with one another. It was allegiance to the thema or to the 
antithema that made these two scholars so outraged. It also explained 
why they, ‘in the face of the same set of experimental data’ (Holton, 
1974, p. 132) made such diverse interpretations of the phenomenon 
in question1. In fixing attention on a thema or antithema, the weight of 
the researcher’s obstinacy steers his/her activity. The attachment to a 
thema does not have necessarily a positive influence on the researcher’s 
1  Holton (1975, p. 331) notes that ‘in his latest phase’ of his work, Heisenberg 
changed his view on this matter.
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thought: while in some cases it may facilitate his/her creative imagina-
tion, in other cases a thema leads the researcher down to blind alleys 
because of immovable convictions that possess his/her mind.
If we turn to non-science, the propensity of viewing the ‘same’ events 
in different ways is even more pervasive: indeed, it is a fact of daily life. 
Divergent perspectives taken on ‘the same event’ move societies forward 
and backward, they are at the heart of revolutions and of misunderstand-
ings. They underlie passions, hopes and fears, imaginations and con-
flicts. Themata such as justice and injustice, freedom and oppression or 
equality and inequality are interpreted so contrarily that disagreements 
in daily life, politics and economics often threaten to undermine societal 
order and lead to violence. Although we could refer to limitless and brutal 
events in daily life, let us illustrate this point with reference to a single 
and long-lasting struggle for justice in the UK. This struggle, which cul-
minated in 2016 had involved a request for the public inquiry concerning 
the event that originally took place in the UK in 1984 and implicated a 
clash between miners and police. Although nobody lost life and nobody 
was arrested, those who passionately fought for the public inquiry for 
32 years, did this in the name of justice. Having lost the possibility of 
the public inquiry, the defendants promise to continue their struggle 
for justice in the future. Justice and injustice in public thinking has been 
found by a number of researchers to be one of the most important the-
matic components of social representations of democracy (e.g. Moodie, 
Marková, and Plichtová, 1995), besides freedom and oppression. 
Themata orientate not only movements of social groups but also of 
individual dissidents who are steered towards a single thema: ‘the truth’. 
Here again, rulers and defendants of a totalitarian regime on the one 
hand, and individual dissidents on the other hand, represent ‘the same 
event’ or ‘the truth’ in contrary terms, and are committed to different 
actions in pursuing their thema. Dissidents in regimes that forbid free 
expressions of speech and of other activities, whether religious (e.g. Jan 
Hus, Giordano Bruno, Galileo) or political (e.g. Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, 
Patočka, Havel), endure physical violence, torture and are even prepared 
to die in pursuing their convictions. 
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4.3 Themata Arise from the ‘General Imaginative Capacity’ of 
Humans
We have seen that themata motivate and underlie a broad spectrum of 
human thought, whether scientific or non-scientific. We have noted above 
that they arise from humans’ ‘general imaginative capacity’ (Holton, 
1973, p. 214). Therefore, it would be wrong to make a sharp distinction 
between these two kinds of human enterprise; instead, themata play an 
integrative role between sciences on the one hand, and humanities and 
other forms of non-scientific thinking on the other. Their mutual relations 
are also given by the fact that physical sciences often adopt terminol-
ogy from the world of human relations, for example, from psychology. 
Human sciences, in their turn – and psychology specifically – adopt termi-
nology from physics in order to appear more scientific! (Holton, 1975, p. 
332). Nevertheless, it would be equally wrong to claim that sciences and 
non-sciences are basically the same activities. Holton (1974, p. 66) notes, 
that we should treasure both their affinities as well as their differences.
Holton’s (1978) analysis of scientific imagination, which is based on 
single case studies of physicists, draws attention to the unique nature 
of individual creativity within the scientific community. In and through 
interdependence between the psychological characteristics of the indi-
vidual and his/her social circumstances, themata can be understood as 
having a life-cycle; they arise, are maintained and fade away. Concepts 
of thematic thinking and of thematic analysis are used in anthropology, 
art criticism, and indeed in any field that acknowledges the interdepen-
dence between motives, intentions, activities and other capacities of the 
individual and of the community in which he/she lives. 
In conclusion, in its concrete forms the process of thematisation takes 
place both at the collective and individual plane. The collective compo-
nent of thematisation is embedded in culture, social events and history, 
while the individual component is unique to each person and is due to 
his/her experience and general imaginative and thinking capacity. The 
collective component in which the thema is embedded, is interdepen-
dent with the individual’s imaginative capacity to formulate narratives, 
explanations, hypotheses, arguments and justifications.
Brought to you by | University of Stirling
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/19/18 2:14 PM
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 19, 2017
Center for the Philosophy of Sciences of Lisbon University
Themata in Science and in Common Sense
78
5. Beyond Themata as Dyadic Oppositions
In introducing themata as forms of scientific explanation, Holton 
(1974; 1975) finds it fruitful to refer to their three uses in physical 
sciences. These three usages fulfil different roles in thematic analysis. 
The first use is a thematic concept or thematic component of a concept, 
for example, continuity and discontinuity, symmetry and asymmetry or 
force and inertia. The second usage refers to a methodological thema. 
A methodological thema has an epistemological role: it guides the direc-
tion of the pursuit of science. The third use is a thematic proposition or 
a hypothetical thema. This last usage lies between the former two, and 
it can be considered as a potential for further development of a particu-
lar physical theory. In giving examples of hypothetical themata, Holton 
refers to Newton’s hypothesis of an immovable centre of the Earth and 
to Einstein’s hypothesis of the special theory of relativity (Holton, 1975, 
p. 330). Both hypotheses were later revised in the light of new discover-
ies. Holton’s examples of hypothetical themata refer to strictly physical 
hypotheses and I cannot find any examples of these in common sense 
thinking. This is due to the fact that while a physicist can make scientif-
ically based predictions about physical phenomena, unless one adopts 
a machine-like approach to humans, one cannot make predictions of 
this kind about intentions, motives and creative imaginations of human 
agents. Therefore, in the remainder of this article I shall focus on the 
two former usages, that is, on thematic concepts and on methodological 
themata.
Holton does not claim that some themata fulfil their roles only as the-
matic concepts and others only as methodological themata. I shall inter-
pret his notion of ‘different uses of themata’ (Holton, 1975, p. 330) as a 
leeway that one and the same thema can be used in different ways and 
can serve different purposes, that is, as a thematic concept in one case 
and as a methodological thema in another case. What matters, is whether 
the researcher focuses on a particular thema in terms of the develop-
ment and transformation of thematic concept, or whether he/she uses 
that thema as the law or the rule of the discipline in question, providing 
epistemological guidance with respect to the growth of knowledge.
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6. A Thematic Concept or a Thematic Component of the Concept
Holton (1974, p. 28) notes that in science it is rare to find a pure the-
matic concept and that it is more common to refer to a thematic compo-
nent of a concept. As I understand it, scientific concepts are complex and 
each concept may involve a number of thematic components, for exam-
ple symmetry and asymmetry, continuity and discontinuity, stability and 
variability, and so on. In examining various dyadic themata throughout 
history, we usually find that proponents of a particular thema conceive 
their chosen dyadic component to be superior to the other, unchosen 
component. Nevertheless, for one reason or other, positions of cho-
sen and unchosen components and of their superior and inferior status 
may change. Let us consider symmetry and asymmetry as examples of 
thematic components of concepts and their transformations over time. 
Symmetry and asymmetry belong to the oldest thematic components in 
European thought (Marková, 2012). The ancient Greek meanings of sym-
metry referred, on the one hand, to the ideal of beauty and perfection, 
and on the other hand, to symmetries in organic and inorganic nature 
(Weyl, 1952). Asymmetry, in contrast, was usually defined negatively, as 
a lack of symmetry. Etymologically, in ancient Greek thinking, asymme-
try referred to disproportion or deformity. Crivellato and Ribatti (2008) 
analysed the representation of the human body in ancient Greece. The 
authors point out that symmetry as a symbol of beauty and harmony, 
which dominated almost all aspects of ancient Greece from arts to liter-
ature and sciences, was also present in anatomical representations. The 
Greeks visualised the human body not only as being symmetrical from 
the outside, but also internally. Therefore, they misrepresented asymme-
tries in a number of bodily organs, such as the vascular system, toes, and 
the brain, among others. These mistakes were due to the Greek craving 
for symmetry as a symbol of perfection as well as to religious and social 
restrictions prohibiting detailed dissections of human bodies.
It was the modern science of the 20th century that re-conceptualised 
and re-thematised the meaning of symmetry and asymmetry. Drawing 
on electrodynamics, Galam and Moscovici (1991; 1994; 1995) discuss 
the breaking of symmetry as a more general phenomenon that is ‘evi-
denced at several levels of reality from cosmology to biology’ (Galam and 
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Moscovici, 1994, p. 481). Both physical and biological systems emerge 
from the spontaneous movements of matter, from its symmetrical to 
asymmetrical states and, from static to dynamic states. The concept 
of symmetry in modern physics retains its importance with reference 
to laws of invariance and it still dominates certain fields in physics, 
e.g. the theory of relativity2. Nevertheless, the concept of ‘spontaneous 
symmetry breaking’ has become one of the most important ones to 
account for dynamic physical effects and has become widely discussed 
and researched. For example, Nambu (2008) titled his Nobel Prize lecture 
Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking in Particle Physics: a Case of Cross-Fer-
tilization. He maintained that spontaneous breaking of symmetry may 
occur throughout the entire space-time. As the universe expands and 
cools down, this dynamic effect may undergo symmetry breaking and 
may change the laws of physics.
If we turn to the common-sense analysis of themata, here again, we find 
an interplay of dyadic components that change over time and socio-cul-
tural conditions. For example, the complex concept (or better the social 
representation) of ‘Roma’ is construed around a number of thematic com-
ponents such as nomadic versus sedentary, pure versus impure or beg-
gars versus musicians, and so on. ‘Roma’ have been thematised either 
negatively, and referred to as beggars and delinquents living outside the 
law, or positively, as musicians and travelling entertainers (Moscovici, 
2011, p. 457). Having been established and maintained for centuries, 
such and other thematic components circulate in public discourse and 
justify social interaction between majorities and ‘Roma’. Their relative 
stabilities and changes are determined by temporarily held societal pref-
erences and beliefs about minorities. Thus we find that, on the one hand, 
the taboo precluding the contact of members of majorities with Gypsies 
perpetuates their discrimination in various parts of European countries. 
On the other hand, in order to accord with demands for human rights, 
the legal protection of ‘Roma’ families and groups has been launched in 
all European countries (Moscovici, 2011, p. 459). 
2  It is well known that Albert Einstein rejected asymmetry as too complex, disruptive 
and as unnatural. Elkana (1982) provides a number of examples of Einstein’s preferences 
for symmetry over asymmetry noting that Einstein connected symmetry, harmony and 
beauty with simplicity of explanations and with the organising principle of intuition.
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7.  Methodological Themata 
As I understand it, Holton’s adjective ‘methodological’ does not refer 
to a single ‘method’ or to specific ‘methods’, but to ‘methodology’ as 
a domain of scholarship concerned with the theoretical analysis of the 
corpus of methods and therefore, with the direction in which the search 
for knowledge takes place. Therefore, I presume that Holton’s method-
ological themata can be called epistemological themata.
Until now, Holton’s followers, who have been concerned with themata 
in humanities, have neglected the usage of methodological or epistemo-
logical themata, or they recognised them only implicitly. And yet, meth-
odological or epistemological themata are laws of science and therefore, 
the principal forces determining the direction in which any search for 
knowledge takes place. This would suggest that methodological themata 
also steer the manner in which thematic concepts and thematic compo-
nents of concepts are thematised and comprehended. This suggestion 
will be verified below. 
7.1 Analysis and Synthesis
Holton (1978) considers analysis and synthesis to be among the most 
pervasive and fundamental themata in all intellectual activities, both 
scientific and non-scientific. They have permeated methodological prac-
tices of philosophers and scientists from Plato and Aristotle through to 
Newton, Kant, Hegel and Einstein, as well as the techniques in chemistry, 
logic and psychology, among others. Although they are dyadic opposi-
tions, analysis and synthesis are mutually related and complementary 
to one another. Holton (1978, p. 112) characterises this point by stating 
that ‘[T]he synthesis provides a framework for interpretation and anal-
ysis of particulars that help to propel thought and feeling to important 
truths’. Both analysis and synthesis take multiple forms and different 
scholarly and professional activities may prefer one or the other. Commit-
ments of intellectuals and professionals either to analysis or synthesis is 
reflected also in other kinds of terms. For example, in dyadic oppositions 
such as reductionism versus holism, dichotomisation versus unification, 
fragmentation versus wholeness, and differentiation versus integration, 
the former term refers to analysis and the latter to synthesis.
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Generally, different forms of synthesis denote unifying and synoptic 
frameworks in philosophy, natural and social sciences, humanities and 
arts, within which imposing projects are conducted, imagined and inter-
preted. Great achievements of Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Darwin, 
Goethe and Tolstoy are only a few examples of magnificent syntheses. 
If considered as a cultural achievement, Holton remarks that synthesis 
has more prestige than analysis because its synoptic outlook is part of 
general education. One might wonder, however, whether this still applies 
to the contemporary consumerist outlook that dominates societies and 
their educational institutions. 
In contrast, in professional and scientific domains, Holton insists, anal-
ysis is more valuable than synthesis. On the one hand, high achievements 
of analysis, for example, those made in mathematics by Descartes or 
Fourier, and in philosophy by Russell or G.E. Moore, strike one by their 
ingenuity and clarity. On the other hand, analysis often provides simpli-
fied and reductionist ways in which phenomena are considered. This has 
become particularly controversial in human and social sciences which, in 
order to be accepted as scientific disciplines, reduce their rich phenom-
ena to measurable elements. Encouraged by technological achievements, 
the use of computers and the internet, school and higher education 
embraces mechanistic outlooks to their limits. Such extremist positions 
are far away from Holton’s perspective on analysis and synthesis. Crit-
ical of the mechanistic and materialistic approach to the contemporary 
preoccupations with scientific objectivity, he draws attention to dangers 
and even pathologies that attempt to separate analysis and synthesis 
in seeking a unique and homogeneous perspective in nature and life. 
Instead, it is vital to understand the full imaginative and intellectual 
power of each of these two thematic components rather than be drawn 
by their asymmetric status, which may mislead scholars and direct them 
to reductionist approaches (Holton, 1978, pp. 112–113). Viewed in this 
light, analysis and synthesis as methodological themata provide a funda-
mental epistemological role in intellectual activities in directing the ways 
in which research and professional practices are conducted. 
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7.2 Complementarity 
In 1927 the Danish physicist Niels Bohr proposed the solution to dual-
ity of light that was the subject of dispute by Schrödiger and Heisenberg 
discussed above. Bohr suggested that processes of continuity and dis-
continuity with respect to the nature of light are not separate, but com-
plementary. He introduced complementarity as a methodological thema. 
Bohr argued that whether one interprets light as corpuscular or as waves 
depends on the experimental conditions that the researcher creates. In 
other words, the agent (the subject or the measuring instrument) and the 
phenomenon (the object of measurement) are in a unique and comple-
mentary relationship (Bohr, 1955). The measuring device shows either 
particle or wave descriptions, but not both at the same time. As he (Bohr, 
1949, p. 210) explains, this is why ‘evidence obtained under different 
experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single pic-
ture’. One needs to consider that it is the totality of different conditions 
under which the phenomenon is examined that provides the possible 
information about that phenomenon. Evidence under different experi-
mental conditions must not be treated as something final, because only 
the totality of information under different conditions, which are comple-
mentary to one another, brings us closer to the truth. It is in this sense 
that Bohr’s concept of complementarity is the perspective according to 
which the agent and the phenomenon under study are interdependent.
In the article on ‘Science and the unity of knowledge’ Bohr (1955) 
maintained that he was not searching for a universal description and 
observation of phenomena, but for specific conditions that apply to spe-
cific subjects and objects. He clarified that complementarity is not just 
a methodological or an epistemological thema in physics, but that it 
extends to all natural and human phenomena and to the explanation 
of the nature of reality. It is applicable to various spheres of life, such 
as psychology, biology, anthropology and others (Bohr, 1999). Each of 
these domains involves specific subjects and objects with their particular 
kinds of stabilities and variabilities, and continuities and discontinuities. 
Conditions for their description and observation differ from one domain 
to another, and it is not possible to reduce one domain into another. In 
its broadest sense Bohr referred to complementarity as an epistemology 
of life (Rosenfeld, 1963/1979, p. 535; Marková, 2014).
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7.3 Self and Other as Methodological or Epistemological Themata
If we return to the theory of social representations, Serge Moscovici 
conceived themata as thematic concepts or as thematic components of 
concepts, rather than as methodological or epistemological themata. 
For example, the above mentioned dyadic oppositions such as nomadic 
and sedentary or pure and impure, were thematic components of the 
concept of ‘Roma’. Thematisation of these components was dependent 
on the underlying social and cultural perspectives of the users. If we 
take another of Moscovici’s thema in common-sense thinking arising 
from the dyadic opposition man versus woman (Moscovici and Vignaux, 
1994/2000), here again we find that it fulfils the role of a thematic 
concept. As a thematic concept, man and woman has had a very long 
career in the history of humankind and has undergone tremendous vari-
ations in meanings across cultures and in history. It has been thema-
tised in numerous ways, bringing out different thematic components 
such as ‘feminism’ versus ‘male chauvinism’ (Moscovici and Vignaux, 
1994/2000), or ‘female ethics of care’ versus ‘male concern with rights 
and rules’ (Gilligan, 1982). This thematic concept can be further thema-
tised in terms of thematic components focusing on differences between 
men and women in their anatomy, interests, motivations, and in many 
other ways. These differences still dominate public discourse in all parts 
of the world. While in Western countries the public discourse is directed 
towards the struggle to assure an equal treatment of men and women 
in all spheres of life (economy, politics, education), in various countries 
of Asia and Africa it is orientated towards the struggle for basic rights of 
women (in sexuality, against honour killing of women, their involvement 
in daily activities, and so on).
In sum, we can say that research on themata in social representations 
has explicitly referred to themata in terms of Holton’s thematic concepts 
(or thematic components of concepts).
However, in and through expanding empirical research, a number 
of researchers have implicitly identified one thema as being a forceful 
epistemological (or methodological) thema: the Self and Other. Smith, 
O’Connor and Joffe (2015, p. 1.2) state: ‘Research on social representa-
tions of risks has revealed that a single thema, self/other, shapes public 
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engagement with a diverse range of threats. The current paper leverages 
this case to develop theorization of the role played by themata in the 
construction of common sense, and to advance understanding of the 
underlying drivers of social responses to contemporary risk issues’. More 
than that, the centrality of the thema Self and Other(s) has been subse-
quently systematically explored. The research team led by Hélène Joffe 
has explored social representations of risks from emerging infectious 
diseases, climate changes and earthquakes (e.g. Joffe, 2011; Joffe and 
Haarhoff, 2002; Joffe, Washer and Solberg, 2011; Joffe et al. 2013; Smith 
and Joffe, 2013; Smith, O’Connor and Joffe, 2015). For these authors, the 
Self and Other(s) is a unifying thema that arises from common sense – 
in our terms, the Self and Other(s) is conceived here as a fundamental 
epistemological thema. It underlies the ways through which the public 
confronts the risks that threaten individuals, groups and communities. 
On the basis of the Self and Other(s) as epistemological thema, these 
authors derived other themata – or, in Holton’s terms, thematic compo-
nents of concepts, such as identity-protection versus identity-spoiling, 
clean versus dirty, moral versus immoral, among others.
Another research group led by Gail Moloney also focuses on the cen-
trality of the Self and Other(s), in their studies of organ and blood dona-
tion (e.g. Moloney, Hall, and Walker, 2005; Moloney, Williams, and Blair, 
2012; Moloney, Walker, and Charlton, 2013; Moloney, Gamble, Hayman 
and Smith, 2015). This research group, too, views the Self and Other(s) 
as ‘the basic thema’having a ‘generative potential’. These authors sug-
gest that the thema Self and Other(s) underpins the public understand-
ing of blood donation and that it affects the individual’s engagement 
or disengagement with blood donation. This basic thema activates the 
occurrence of numerous thematic components and generates represen-
tations that are either salient for the Self, like anxiety, fear of needles, 
or for the Other, like helping Others and saving their lives. The authors 
emphasise that thematisation is driven by the ways these issues are 
understood in particular contexts, particular times and places. They show 
the co-existence of contradictory understanding of the issues in question 
which manifest themselves as multiple voices, created by fear of pain and 
danger to the Self, and at the same time by willingness to help Others, 
improve their health prospects and lives.
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Our own research on HIVAIDS in Scottish prisons and in studies of hae-
mophilia, also showed that the thema Self and Other served as a basis 
for creating other themata, such as the perception of risk, blaming the 
other, and the search for social recognition (Marková et al. 1995). In the 
case of haemophilia, we found that for many patients the knowledge of 
the disease and its spread was less important than their fear that they 
could be rejected by Others if the fact became known that they had been 
infected by HIV (Marková et al. 1990). Equally, although patients and their 
families were well aware that the virus did not spread by daily contact, 
the families tried to keep a ‘clean house’ and they associated the dis-
ease with uncleanliness. These representations resulted from mixtures 
of traditions, established common sense knowing, and the Self/Other 
interactions.
These studies, focusing on the Self and Other(s) interdependence, show 
asymmetric relations between the Self and Other(s): the Self usually asso-
ciates the danger, threat and risk with the Other(s). Such representations 
have established themselves during the history of humankind, during 
which privileging the Self (his/her family, clan or group) over the Other 
has become a common-sense assumption. The eminent anthropologist 
Ruth Benedict (1942, pp. 98–99) observed that the belief in superiority of 
one’s own group over another group has a very long history; already in 
human prehistory, ‘we’ and ‘they’ relations were fundamental to life. The 
preference for one’s own group is very deeply and unconsciously rooted 
and therefore, it is hard to eradicate or even to reflect on it. The social 
psychologist Gustav Ichheiser (1940; 1949) noted that whilst beliefs in 
moral and intellectual superiority of one’s own group over another one 
are difficult to abolish, one can at least recognize that these beliefs are 
part of life. Rather than admitting to ourselves our moral, intellectual and 
other kinds of shortcomings, we attribute them to Others, rationalize 
our thoughts and conduct, and invent fictitious notions and reasons to 
justify our behaviour (Ichheiser, 1951).
8. Conclusion
This article discusses the perspective according to which scientific 
and non-scientific knowing and thinking, including common sense, are 
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brought together in and through themata, the basic elements of thought 
which usually take form of dyadic oppositions. Themata both differenti-
ate and connect science and non-science. Their vital convergences stem 
from the natures of scientific and non-scientific thinking as cultural prod-
ucts. In both activities themata provide a rich scope for imagination and 
creativity. Their divergences are due to the fact that only a small number 
of themata has been shown relevant to scientific activities and to the 
development of scientific theories. The expert’s firm commitment to a 
thema results from the consideration of scientific procedures relevant to 
the theory in question and it precludes interference of other issues, e.g. 
values, personal interests, etc. Scientific communication is restricted to 
experts; the commitment to a thema may enrich or constrain scientific 
progress.
In contrast, themata in non-scientific thinking (and in common-sense 
thinking) are limitless. They are thematised in public discourses they 
circulate through communication. While scientific communication is 
restricted to experts and supposedly precludes values and interests, 
non-scientific communication is hardly ever neutral. In words of Niels 
Bohr, humans are suspended in language; thematisation involves judge-
ments, evaluations and attribution of responsibilities with respect to 
events in question.
Among their different uses, methodological or epistemological the-
mata, e.g. analysis and synthesis, give direction and coherence to sci-
entific as well as to non-scientific thinking. In common-sense think-
ing, the Self an Others appear to be the central epistemological thema. 
The Self and Other are intimately bound together by ethical relations: 
humans evaluate one another, they trust and distrust each other, they 
take responsibility for one another and they attempt to avoid it (Mar-
ková, 2016). Selfhood arises in and through interdependence with oth-
ers (Ricoeur, 1990/1992) through themata that involve ethical consid-
erations, self-promotion and other-denigration. They often perpetuate 
implicitly through generations, without being brought into explicit aware-
ness. Bringing themata to consciousness stimulates social change. It is 
up to humans to direct the actualisation of thematic components of the 
Self and Other(s). 
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